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THE TOBACCO LITIGATION MERRY-GO-ROUND:
DID THE MSA MAKE IT STOP?
Shital A. Patel
"What is different about tobacco litigation, however, is
that the potential claimants are so numerous, the scope of
the offending conduct so vast and the resources of the
defendants so huge, that conventional litigation is simply
inadequate to capture and contain the issues or assure
appropriate relief. It thus fails as both a policy and a
compensatory vehicle."'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is rarely disputed that litigation in this country rises every year, and
tobacco litigation is no exception. The sheer numbers demonstrate that
the tobacco litigation war is far from over, and the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement has failed in decreasing tobacco litigation
overall.2  The Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA") is an accord
signed on November 16, 1998 between the state Attorneys General of
forty-six states, five U.S. territories, the District of Columbia and the
four major tobacco and cigarette producers: Philip Morris Inc., R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., Lorillard Tobacco Corp., and Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co.3 Arguably, an underlying assumption of the
settlement is that it existed for settlement purposes and should
discourage further litigation.4 A settlement somewhat implies that a
resolution-an agreement-has been reached; thus, the tobacco war
should have been quelled somewhat in the last six years.5 In other
words, an implicit goal of the MSA was to reduce and resolve the
onslaught of tobacco litigation. While it was formally a settlement
'Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors, and Public Policy, 26 AM.
J.L. & MED. 187, 189 (2000).2See Peter D. Jacobson, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 224, 230 (2002).
3See Philip Morris USA - Responsible Marketing: Tobacco Settlement Agreement, at
http://www.pmusa.com/responsible marketing/tobacco-settlement-agreement.asp
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).4Eric A. Feldman, The Landscape of Japanese Tobacco Policy: Law, Smoking, and
Social Change, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, n62 (2001).
5Id.6See Federal News Service (July 24, 2003).
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between the States Attorneys General and the tobacco companies, the
upshot could have--or should have-been a much greater reduction of
7tobacco-related litigation. While the States Attorney Generals may
have resolved their legal dispute with Big Tobacco temporarily, the rest
of Americans have not and continue to battle it out in court. Even its
name-the Master Settlement Agreement-suggests great expectations
for what seemed to be a landmark conclusion between the industry and
the people, as represented by the U.S. government. 8 It possessed
elements of a public-private partnership, which might have had the
long-lasting effect of solutions to tobacco litigation.9 Thus, the MSA
was insufficient in terms of deterring litigation and a second settlement
is necessary.
A. The Master Settlement Agreement
"The Master Settlement Agreement is just one brick in the regulatory
edifice that houses the smoking policy of the United States." 10 "The
MSA was a unique, litigator-created document of monumental scale
that arose out of unprecedented litigation strategy."'" The MSA
resolved numerous state-initiated suits against the four major tobacco
companies, known as the "Majors". 12  The Majors and Attorneys
General signed the MSA after four prior agreements were entered
between the Majors and the states of Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi,
and Texas.'3 As an omnibus settlement among state governments and
tobacco companies, the MSA represented the final product of a massive
negotiation process for the states seeking recovery of Medicare funds
from tobacco manufacturers. 14 The MSA addressed two demands that
tobacco control advocates have asserted for years: restrictions on the
industry's advertising and more money for anti-smoking campaigns. 15
Thus, the settlement stipulated that states, territories, and the District of
Columbia could attain portions of a $256 billion pool, financed by the
7Id.8Donald W. Garner, Up in Smoke: Coming to Terms with the Legacy of Tobacco,
Tobacco Wars and the New Minority, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 15, 16 (1998).
9Seth M. Wood, The Master Settlement Agreement as Class Action: An Evaluative
Framework for Settlements of Publicly Initiated Litigation, 89 VA. L. REV. 597, 599
(2003).
1
°Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141 (2003).
"
tWood, supra note 9, at 597.
12Id.
13See Tobacco Settlement Agreement, supra note 3.
14Wood, supra note 9, at 597.
"
5Jacobson, supra note 2, at 229.
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Majors, in exchange for dismissing pending or soon-to-be-pending
litigation against those companies.
16
In addition to monetary benefits to the states, the MSA places
restrictions on marketing, advertising, and promotion of tobacco
products-primarily cigarettes. 1 7  "Restrictions placed on tobacco
advertising have been hailed as the most important non-monetary
restriction achieved by the MSA." 18 The Agreement forbids tobacco
companies from marketing directly or indirectly "to Youth within any
Settling State...,19 Advertising restrictions include bans on transit and
outdoor advertising and on the usage of cartoon images.20 Another
section of the MSA obligates the tobacco companies to pay the private
practice attorneys who represented the settling states "$750 million per
year for five years and, thereafter, $500 million per year indefinitely. 21
Moreover, the MSA provides each signatory state Attorney General
with independent enforcement authority to ensure compliance with the
22agreement. A $50 million dollar enforcement fund was established
for this purpose.
23
In the wake of the Master's Settlement Agreement came a
landslide of tobacco litigation, often resulting in highly publicized,
multi-million or billion dollar damage awards to aggrieved smokers and
their families. 24 Furthermore, as this article will discuss, post-MSA
tobacco litigation involves the enforcement and interpretation of the
settlement agreement, as well as individual lawsuits from citizens
asserting claim to MSA settlement money to the states. In addition to
the main goals of the MSA-reducing youth smoking and recouping
payment for state medical treatment-an implicit goal has been to
resolve the mountain of pending tobacco litigation. Six years after the
signing of the MSA, however, tobacco litigation has not been
16Wood, supra note 9, at 597.
17Robert L. Kline, Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and What
Remains To Be Done, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 622 (2000).
18Id.
19Tobacco Settlement Agreement, supra note 3.20Kline, supra note 17, at 624.2 1Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and The Separation of Powers in
State Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 568 (2001).
The net present value of these payments to these private attorneys is "about $ 8
billion, using a seven-percent discount rate." Id.
22 Tobacco Settlement Agreement, supra note 3.
23 Id.
24See Meghan A. Crowley, From Punishment to Annihilation: Engle v. RJ Reynolds
Tobacco Co.-No More Butts-Punitive Damages Have Gone Too Far, 34 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 1513 (2001).
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deterred.25 The MSA leaves many questions unanswered. This article
surveys the post-MSA tobacco litigation landscape, argues that the
MSA failed to reduce tobacco-related litigation, and proposes some
suggestions for a second settlement.
The first section of this article discusses the smoking problem
which lead to the MSA, and provides a background of the Master's
Settlement Agreement. The main focus of the article will discuss the
major cases and kinds of tobacco litigation following the MSA. While
the MSA was, indeed, a major stepping stone for Big Tobacco in
accepting responsibility and curbing marketing to youth, the MSA has
done little in the way of remedying excessive litigation. The litigation
following the MSA demonstrates that tobacco issues still need to be
addressed and resolved. The analysis section examines the litigation
statistics of two major tobacco companies, Philip Morris Inc. and R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., between 1998 and 2004 to show how the
litigation has in fact increased since the signing of the MSA. Finally,
this article offers some recommendations for a second settlement.
A. Background: smoking as a health issue
While the problem of smoking and tobacco-related illnesses may have
already fatigued the ears of the public health, the problem bears at least
brief consideration in light of what led to such a colossal deal as the
Master's Settlement Agreement. Why such a public outcry against the
tobacco industry? Why smoking? The subject of tobacco control, much
like gun control and abortion, sparks heated debate.26 Opinions span
the gamut from fiercely protective of the right to use tobacco freely to
staunch advocates of government regulation or abolition of cigarettes
27because of second-hand smoke danger. The stakes of smoking,
25Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 2004 SEC. EXCH. COMM'N 47.26See id.
27"The health implications of tobacco have been contemplated for at least the past
millennium. During the first half of that period, the predominant view was that
tobacco afforded users a wide variety of health benefits." The American Indians
employed tobacco as an analgesic and as treatment for diverse ailments such as
asthma, rheumatism, headaches, fevers, and the pains of childbirth. "Serious medical
and scientific attention to the health consequences of smoking is a phenomenon of the
present century, primarily of its second half." Ellen J. Hahn, Policy Levers for the
Control of Tobacco Consumption, 90 KY. L.J. 1009, 1011 (2001-2002). W. Kip
Viscusi, a reputable scholar and prominent tobacco authority recently said,
"Cigarettes are like knives, chainsaws, snowmobiles, and other risky but useful or
enjoyable products, and should be regulated no more severely." Posner, supra note
10, at 1142.
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22nonetheless, are vast. 28 Tobacco kills more Americans than AIDS,
drugs, homicides, fires, and automobile accidents combined.29
Globally, smoking- related deaths will rise to 10 million per year by
2030 and 7 million of these deaths will occur in less than industrialized
nations.3° Worldwide, tobacco products kill approximately 4.9 million
31people per year.
Irrespective of whether tobacco companies continue to advertise
to young people, smoking is clearly a significant problem among youth.
Approximately 80% of adult smokers started smoking before the age of
18. 32 Every day, nearly five thousand young people under the age of 18
try their first cigarette.3 3 Two thousand of them will then become daily
smokers. 34 If the current smoking patterns in the United States persist,
an estimated 6.4 million of today's children will die prematurely of
tobacco-related diseases. 35 During the decade prior to the MSA, youth
smoking was on the rise, according to The National Cancer Institute,
and approximately 35% of youth were smokers in 1999.36 According
to a June 2001 report released by the Federal Interagency Forum on
Child and Family Statistics, adolescent cigarette use is declining.
37
This report indicates that smoking by eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade
students peaked just before the MSA and has decreased since then.38
28Edward M. Kennedy, The Need for FDA Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 101, 102 (2002).29CrazyWorld Find Facts, at http://www.thetruth.com/truth.cfii (last visited Nov. 12,
2004) (on file with author).30Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of the Surgeon General, at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr2000/sgr--.tobacco-aag.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2004).
3 'Being Bad Blog, at http://charlieblogl.blogspot.com;
http://forum.uniontrib.com/upload/showthread; http://www.blurty.com/talkpost (last
visited Nov. 12, 2004) (posted by Charlotte on Jan. 9, 2004 at 5:15 p.m.) (on file with
author).32 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES: INVESTING WISELY
IN HEALTH (2003), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/pe-factsheets/pe-tobacco.htm.
33 1ld.
34Kennedy, supra note 28, at 102.35CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 32.36National Cancer Institute, Cancer Progress Report: 2003 update, at
http://progressreport.cancer.gov/highlights (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with
author).
37 National Association of Attorneys General, Master Settlement Agreement and
Amendments, at http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-tobacco.php (last visited Nov. 17,
2004).38Id.
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Smoking is not a cost-free vice to American taxpayers. 39 Direct
medical expenditures attributed to smoking amount to more than $75
billion per year in the United States.4 ° Furthermore, smoking costs an
estimated $80 billion per year in lost productivity. 41 Each of the
approximately 22 billion packs of cigarettes sold in the U.S. in 1999
cost the nation an estimated $7.18 in medical care costs and lost
productivity.
42
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services asserts that
tobacco control saves money.43 For example, an economic assessment
found that a health care plan's annual cost of covering treatment to help
people quit smoking ranged from $0.89 to $4.92 per smoker, whereas
the annual cost of treating smoking-related illness ranged from $6.00 to
$33.00 per smoker.44 Recent studies have concluded that reducing
smoking prevalence among pregnant women by one percentage point
over 7 years would prevent 57,200 low-birth weight births and save
$572 million.45
What does the current smoking problem look like? According to
a study released in October 2003 by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the percentage of American adults who
regularly smoke cigarettes fell slightly in 2001.46 The CDC welcomed
these findings, attributing them in part to state anti-tobacco programs
funded by the tobacco companies pursuant to the Master's Settlement
Agreement.47 However, Dr. Corinne Husten, medical officer in the
CDC's Office of Smoking and Health warned, "The states were starting
to fund some comprehensive tobacco-prevention and control programs,
39 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 32.40Id.
411d.42Id.
43Id.
44CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 32.4 5CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 32. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services claim that these recent studies show that every $1
invested in an effective school-based tobacco prevention program saves $19.90 in
associated medical costs. Id.46 Paul Simao, Smoking Rate Dips Among U.S. Adults - CDC Study, Medline Plus
Health Information (Oct. 9, 2003), at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/news/fullstory-14228.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2004) (on file with author). According to this federal study, an estimated 46.2 million
adults, or 22.8 percent of those 18 years and over, reported they were current smokers
in 2001. This compares to an estimated 23.3 percent of adults who smoked the
previous year and 25 percent who did in 1993. Id.47 Id.
[VOL.8.3:615
TOBACCO LITIGATION
but unfortunately with the budget crisis those funds are being lost and
put into general revenues.' 48 Most states are, in fact, failing to use their
portion of the multi-billion dollar settlement dollars from the tobacco
industry to fund tobacco prevention and cessation efforts.49
B. History of the Master Settlement Agreement
In order to create an analytical framework for the tobacco
litigation that followed the MSA, it is useful to develop a very brief
overview of the events leading up to the settlement. Before the early
1950s, the tobacco industry's image remained unaffected by litigation
and negative media attention to their products. 50 This all changed with
the publication of a Reader's Digest article entitled, "Cancer by the
Carton" in 1952.51 Two years later, the tobacco industry faced its first
lawsuit.52 Eva Cooper, whose husband died of lung cancer, sued R.J.
Reynolds. 53 This was the first liability suit by a lung cancer victim
alleging negligence and breach of warranty.54  Cooper lost the suit
because the court ruled that there was no evidence that smoking caused
cancer. 55  The tobacco industry managed to outspend and outlast
plaintiffs for years.56 From 1954 to 1994, approximately 813 claims
were filed by private citizens in tort actions in state courts against
tobacco companies.57 Only twice did the courts find favor of the
plaintiffs, and both decisions were subsequently reversed on appeal.58
48Id.
49Tobacco: States are Failing to Use Settlements to Fund Prevention Programs
Report Says 2001, Bureau of Nat'l Aff. 1 (on file with author).
50World Americas: The US Tobacco Wars, B.B.C. NEWS, Sept. 28, 1999, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/457180.stm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).511d.
52PBS, Inside the Tobacco Deal, Timelines: Full Chronology, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/timelines/fullindex.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
53Id.
54USA Today, Tobacco Settlement, at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/smoke/smoke26.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
Legal experts at the time believed this would be the first of many lawsuits, and
plaintiffs would be rewarded generously. Id.55BBC News, supra note 50. Cooper's case, however, Was the first in an unbroken
string of 300 victories by the tobacco industry over plaintiffs. Id.
56Id.
57LaFrance, supra note 1, at 190.58Id. By 1964, the first U.S. Surgeon General's report was issued, citing the health
risks associated with smoking, and warning labels were placed on cigarette packs a
year later. PBS, supra note 52. By 1988, the Surgeon General reported that nicotine
was an addictive drug. USA Today, supra note 54. At a 1983 trial involving plaintiff
Rose Cipollone against the tobacco industry, a study called "The Motives and
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It was Diane Castano's 1994 case, nonetheless, that grew into
the nation's largest class action suit of smokers. 59 In 1996, the court
struck down the class action status of the Castano case, calling it too
unwieldy to cover all states.60
"No court has ever tried an injury-as-addiction case... The Castano
class suffers from many of the difficulties that the Georgine court
found dispositive. The class members were exposed to nicotine
through different products, for different amounts of time, and over
different time periods. Each class member's knowledge about the
effects of smoking differs, and each plaintiff began smoking for
different reasons. Each of these factual differences impacts the
application of legal rules such as causation, reliance, comparative
fault, and other affirmative defenses."
61
The tobacco industry became a public health pariah as an
onslaught of individual liability suits occurred and as the federal
government began to investigate the industry's actions.62 Each of the
seven executives of the leading tobacco manufacturers, including Philip
Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard, and Brown & Williamson, testified
and swore during the Waxman Congressional hearings that they
"believe nicotine is not addictive".63 At the same time, the states' legal
crusade against the tobacco industry began taking hold, on both the
litigation and legislative fronts.64 Mississippi Attorney General Mike
Moore filed the first state lawsuit against the industry in May 1994,
explaining that the case was "premised on a simple notion-you cause
the health crisis, you pay for it."
65
Incentives of Cigarette Smoking" came to light. At the Cipollone trial, tobacco
industry documents were revealed, denting the industry's longtime armor. Id.
59 PBS, supra note 52; USA Today, supra note 54.60See USA Today, supra note 54.61Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 7-34, 742-43 (5th Cir. 1996).62See PBS, supra note 52.63Id.
64DeBow, supra note 21, at 566.65Id. At the same time, the Florida legislature laid the foundation for a similar suit by
passing the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (MTPLA), which stacked the deck
against tobacco company defendants in any recoupment suit brought by the state. The
MPTLA stripped the defendants of all of their pre-existing common law affirmative
defenses, allowed the use of market share liability, replaced long-standing concepts of
causation and damages with "statistical analysis," and dispensed with the requirement
that the state identify the individual recipients whose illnesses were treated through
state health care programs. Id.
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Upon the gathering momentum among the states, the industry
signaled a willingness to discuss settlement in early 1997. 66 During the
congressional deliberations, however, the tobacco companies had
negotiated individual settlements with four states that had advanced
farthest down the litigation trail-Florida, Minnesota, Texas and
Mississippi.67 After the national settlement proposal settlement failed
in Congress, the state and tobacco companies returned to the bargaining
table. 68 On November 16, 1998 a "Master Settlement Agreement" was
announced between the four largest tobacco companies-known as the
"Majors"-and the remaining forty-six states, the District of Columbia,
and five U.S. Territories, collectively referred to in this article as "the
states".69
Each state action lists two primary goals and forms of relief:
first, to recover state funds expended in treating tobacco-related illness
through its Medicaid or state employee health insurance plan and
second, to enjoin the tobacco companies from engaging in any
marketing that may appeal to underage consumers of tobacco
products.7  "During a press conference following the release of the
MSA, Washington Attorney General Christine Gregoire stated that
these two aims were critical to the success of the settlement
negotiations., 71 The MSA directly states these goals in the agreement
that representatives of the settling states signed the agreement "in
order... to reduce youth smoking, to promote public health and to
secure monetary payments" to the states.72
The monetary sum agreed to in the MSA required the tobacco
companies to pay $10 billion per year to the states over the course of
twenty-five years, until the year 2023. 73 In addition, the tobacco
companies agreed to "contribute" $1.5 billion over five years to an anti-
smoking education and advertising campaign and $250 million to a
66Id. at 567. Congress debated the 1997 settlement proposal at length, and, as it debate
wore on, the debate attracted many special interest amendments and conditions. The
tobacco industry also sought federal legislation during 1997 that would have settled
its liability and imposed limited obligations upon it. This effort failed, however, and
was followed by legislation proposed by Senator John McCain, with a price tag of
approximately $520 billion. In late July 1998, settlement with the states was stymied,
and the tobacco companies walked away from the settlement proposal. Id.67Id.
681Id. at 568.
69 1d.
70Wood, supra note 9, at 609.
7 Id. at 610.72Id.
73DeBow, supra note 21, at 567; Kline, supra note 17.
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foundation dedicated to reducing teen smoking. 74 The net present value
of these payments to the states pursuant to the MSA has been estimated
at $281.6 billion.75
The MSA also provided for payments to the plaintiffs'
attorneys. 76 In a typical court award to a plaintiff in a personal injury
case, a portion of the award amount is used to pay the attorneys' fees. 77
In the MSA, however, the attorneys' fees are borne by the tobacco
companies rather than the states. 78  An economist on the Harvard
faculty, W. Kip Viscusi noted, "The general public may be so upset to
see lawyers receiving billions of dollars in compensation so that the
political salability of the agreement can be enhanced by making
attorneys' fees appear to be a distinct and less visible component.'
79
Under the MSA provisions, the Majors are obligated to pay the private
practice attorneys who represented the settling states $750 million per
year for five years and, thereafter, $500 million per year indefinitely. 80
Media experts have pegged the estimated total attorneys' fees to be
awarded for all states to be in the $20 billion range for fewer than five
hundred lawyers.
81
Besides requiring payments of about $325 million to a National
Foundation directed at reducing youth tobacco use, the MSA includes
some additional provisions that require direct cigarette company action
related to reducing youth tobacco usages.82 This section on "Corporate
Culture Commitments" includes requiring the tobacco companies to
establish corporate principles that explain their commitment to comply
with the MSA and otherwise reduce tobacco among youth and
regularly communicate their commitment to reduce youth tobacco use
to their employees and customers. 83  In trying to change tobacco
companies from the inside out, this section of the MSA requires them
74Id. at 568.75Id.
76Viscusi, supra note 27, at 542.
77 Id.
781d. The process of determining these fees has been relatively well hidden. Id.79 1d.
8
°DeBow, supra note 21, at 568. The net present value of these payments to the
private attorneys is about $8 million, using a 7% discount rate. Id.81Viscusi, supra note 27, at 542-43. How high the actual payments will be, or if they
will be greater, is uncertain. Id.
82 Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Multistate Settlement Agreement Provisions
Relating to Cigarette Company "Anti-Youth-Smoking Efforts, at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0133.pdf (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).83Id.
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to designate executive level managers to identify ways to reduce youth
access to tobacco products and reduce youth tobacco use and encourage
employees to find ways to reduce youth tobacco use.
8 4
C. Why did they settle?
A focal question remains why the tobacco companies and states settled.
One simplistic, yet plausible view is that the tobacco companies
committed a tort against smokers, and the* states, acting as
representatives and insurers for smokers and their families, are
subrogated to their claims.85 The states did not make a subrogation
claim, however, because this would have invited litigation from the
Medicaid recipients who would have had a right, under subrogation
principles, to collect from the states if the states recovered damages in
excess of the cost of care. 86 Under parens patriae, this viewpoint
expresses that the states have a quasi-sovereign interest in the well-
being of their citizens.8 7  This theory proposes that the states are
socially and financially harmed by the injuries suffered by all
smokers-not only Medicaid recipients-and are entitled to restitution
from the tobacco industry.
88
Critics have also reasoned that the tobacco industry settled
because it believed it would become more vulnerable as tort standards
evolved, as additional information about the tobacco executives' past
conduct became known, and as states prepared to use or create legal
devices that were not available to individual plaintiffs.89 Essentially,
attitudes towards smoking had been changing for many years before the
MSA was negotiated, and the MSA was likely a reflection of these
changes.9 ° For the tobacco companies to realize this and settle, it can
be said then that "the decision to settle was prescient rather than
foolish". 91 By inviting and settling the state litigation, the tobacco
companies will have arguably obtained what Congress denied
legislatively and will need only deal with individual litigation.92 Some
84Id.
8 5Posner, supra note 10, at 1143.
86Id.
871Id. at 1144.
881d.
89Id.
90Posner, supra note 10, at 1144.
9 1Id.
92LaFrance, supra note 1, at 190. "Indeed, part of the companies' motive in gathering
the States into a single settlement may have been precisely to avoid a comprehensive
resolution of health issues. The essence of litigation in our system focuses entirely on
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commentators caution that individual litigation will be countered with
individual settlements in tandem with legislative lobbying in the fifty
states, a technique for reducing liability which has proven successful in
other industries, such as asbestos and insurance.
93
One of the practical theories of why the tobacco companies
would agree to make such lavish payments to the states and live under
new regulatory constraints is to gain protection from bankruptcy and
loss of market share.94 The financial stakes in the state suits were great
because the tobacco manufacturers faced a line of state plaintiffs, who
could learn from one another's trials, and slowly drain the defendant's
finances. 95  Another perspective proposes that the tobacco industry
benefits because the MSA cartelizes industry and guards against
destabilization of the cartel by erecting barriers to entry that preserve
the 99 percent market dominance of the tobacco giants.
9 6
Why did the states and tobacco companies settle instead of
continuing with individual lawsuits? One element of impracticability
with respect to conducting numerous separate lawsuits concerns
litigation costs.9 7 "As each state must incur costs litigating a particular
case, its amount of possible recovery decreases.' 98 Some costs would
at least be redundant, because litigants would have to pay for similar
exhibits, experts, studies, and tests.99 Another important concern "with
conducting multiple trials centers on conflicts over state common law
actions and their results."'100  Multi-state litigation may create
inconsistent or varying adjudications that establish incompatible
standards of conduct for defendants. 1° 1  "Proceeding under similar
theories in separate states might result in different types of damages or
equitable relief being imposed upon the tobacco companies."'
10 2
Multiple defendants would not be judged upon consistent standards
the case and controversy between the individual litigants and limits the resolution to
their particularized grievances. Tobacco litigation is no different." Id. at 189.93 id.
94DeBow, supra note 2 1, at 582.95 id.
96Id. Viscusi also agrees that the MSA mainly serves to cartelize the tobacco industry
at the expense of smokers. See generally, W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A
POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (University of Chicago Press 2002).
97Wood, supra note 9, at 607.9 8id.
99 1d.
1001d.
''lld. at 608.
10 2Wood, supra note 9, at 608.
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across state lines.' °3 Thus, advancing with separate state suits might
have imposed substantial litigation costs on both plaintiffs and
defendants.
10 4
D. Provisions affecting the marketing of tobacco products
A major consequence of the Master's Settlement Agreement is the
severe limitations imposed on the marketing, advertising, and
promotion of tobacco and tobacco products.'0 5  The advertising
restrictions are a complex thicket of legalese and cross-references
among definitions.' °6 In order to gain a basic understanding of the
kinds of advertising limitations imposed by the MSA, this article will
present a simplified overview of the advertising restrictions, which are
very specifically defined in the MSA itself.1
0 7
The MSA bans "outdoor advertising", which includes
billboards, and signs in arenas, video arcades, stadia, and shopping
malls.'0 8 Specific types of outdoor advertising are banned, as well as
certain advertisements placed inside a store if they are still visible from
the outside. 0 9 However, a significant exception to these "outdoor
advertising" bans is that they do not apply to tobacco retail locations,
the places most interested in displaying tobacco advertising." |0 A
tobacco retailer may place an unlimited number of tobacco
advertisements and promotions anywhere on that property as long as
the displays are smaller than fourteen square feet.' It has been
criticized that this exception for tobacco retailers substantially
undercuts the "outdoor advertising" bans. 12 Thus, a gas station selling
cigarettes must abide by the "outdoor advertising" bans, but a tobacco
shop does not. 1'
3
Another exception in the MSA allows outdoor advertising at the
site of a tobacco brand-sponsored event held at an Adult-Only Facility
during the event for fourteen days prior to the event. 1 4 This includes
103 Id.
104Id.
1 0 5Kline, supra note 17, at 622.
106 Id.
'OSee The National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 37.
'
08Kline, supra note 17, at 623.
1091d.
"lId.
"lid.
112d.
113Kline, supra note 17, at 623.
114 Id.
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"Camel Nights" at local bars and nightclubs. 1 5 By sponsoring events
of interest to young adults, these kinds of events target the 18-25 year
old age bracket." 16 Advertising here is limited to promoting the event
by brand name; no other tobacco advertising is allowed." 17
A second major limitation on tobacco advertising in the MSA is
the restriction on transit advertisements placed on or within private or
public vehicles and within transit waiting areas such as bus stops, train
stations, taxi stands, and airports. 1 8 There is, however, an exception
for tobacco retail establishments located in transit waiting areas that
allows displays of tobacco advertising that are no longer than fourteen
square feet.119 Furthermore, Adult-Only Facilities located at transit
waiting areas are allowed to advertise if they are hosting tobacco-
sponsored events during the event and for fourteen days prior to the
event; advertising is limited to sponsorship of the event by brand name
(e.g. "Camel Nights") and no other tobacco advertising. 120  Tobacco
manufacturers were required to remove all non-conforming outdoor
and transit advertisements by April 23, 1999.121 Additionally, tobacco
companies may no longer place advertising upon tops of taxis and sides
of buses.
122
E. Ban on targeting youth
As part of the Master Settlement Agreement, the tobacco companies
agreed not to target youth within the settling states. 2 3 They agreed
"not to take any action the primary purpose of which is to initiate,
maintain or increase youth smoking" within the settling states.1 24
However, the MSA has been criticized for making exceptions to
marketing to youth, because, in fact, this same provision states that the
industry may take actions "that have as their secondary purpose the
initiation, maintenance or increase of youth smoking."' 125 Thus, the anti
115Id.
1 16Id.
117Kline, supra note 17, at 623.
1191d.
1201d.
12'Id. If time was remaining on the lease between a tobacco company and the
billboard or transit company, the signatory state could use the billboard or taxi top for
tobacco control messages. Almost all states took advantage of this opportunity in
various ways. Id.
122Kline, supra note 17, at 623.
123Id. at 624.
124Id.
125 1d.
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youth-targeting provision is ambiguous, because the previous exception
appears contrary to the overall prohibition of targeting youth.
126
Consistent with the provision to cease targeting youth, the MSA
bans the use of cartoon images in the advertising, promotion,
packaging, or labeling of tobacco products.' Incorporated within this
ban of cartoon images are depictions of objects, people, or animal
creatures with comically exaggerated features or superhuman
powers. 128 Depictions of the "Marlboro Man" and "Newport Lovers"
remain unaffected by the cartoon ban.' 29 However, the general cartoon
ban does not include any depictions that were in use July 1, 1998, in
any state on a tobacco company's corporate logo or tobacco product
packaging.' 30 This exception allows R.J. Reynolds to use camels on
Camel packages and advertising, but not in the form of cartoon Joe
Camel. 1
3 1
The MSA also places restrictions upon tobacco product
placement. 132 Tobacco companies are forbidden from making any kind
of payment for product placement in movies, television shows,
theatrical, musical and live performances, commercial films/videos, or
video games.' 33 These restrictions prevent the tobacco industry from
paying for indirect, subtle advertising in popular culture-where young
people are often exposed-such as movies, music video, concerts, and
video games.' 34 However, there are no restrictions upon media creators
who choose to portray images of smoking or tobacco use without
compensation. 35
MSA provisions limit tobacco promotion by brand name
merchandising. 36 Tobacco brand names may no longer appear on
shirts, hats, backpacks, or other gear that might appeal to children. 137
Exceptions to these merchandising restrictions include allowing
tobacco companies to finish any licensing agreements or contracts into
effect as of June 1997 and not requiring recall of products and gear
126Id.
127Kline, supra note 17, at 624.1281d.
129Kline, supra note 17, at 624.1301d.
13 id.
132Id.
133 Id.
134Kline, supra note 17, at 624.
135Id.
136Id. at 624.
137 Id. at 625.
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already marketed, distributed or sold before the signing of the MSA. 38
Tobacco posters, coupons for tobacco products and merchandise, and
merchandise used within Adult-Only facilities are still allowed. 39
Critics point out that there is no way of knowing how much
promotional merchandise is still available to the public and the
loopholes make it difficult to track merchandise that violates the
agreement. 14 Still, the merchandising regulations are meant to prevent
people from acting as billboards for the tobacco industry. 141
Other bans on marketing restrictions include a prohibition on
the distribution of free samples of tobacco products, except in Adult-
Only facilities, and giving "freebies" to minors based on coupons or
proof-of-purchase. 14 2  Tobacco companies, however, are not given
guidelines or restrictions on how to check for proof of age. 143 For
example, a redemption offer could be made via mail by sending a
photocopy of a driver's license or government identification as
sufficient proof, so in-person identification is not necessary 144
The MSA establishes a highly complex set of rules governing
the issue of tobacco brand name sponsorship. 145 The objective is to
proscribe tobacco companies from sponsoring certain cultural and
sporting events-pimarily where a significant percentage of youth
may be present. 6 Common brand name sponsorships include the
"Winston Cup NASCAR" series and "Marlboro racing". 147 Tobacco
companies may no longer sponsor concerts or "events in which the
intended audience is comprised of a significant percentage of youth,"
such as football, basketball, baseball, or hockey.' One shortcoming in
the MSA is the ambiguity in defining what constitutes an audience of
"a significant percent of youth"1 49 For example, if Marlboro were to
sponsor a rodeo that drew a family audience, how can it be determined
whether children are a significant percentage of the audience? 150
138Id.
139Kline, supra note 17, at 625.140°Id.
1411d.
142Id.
143 Id.
144Kline, supra note 17, at 625.
145Id. at 626.
146Id.
1471d.
148Id.
149Kline, supra note 17, at 626.
5
°Id. at 627.
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Additionally, tobacco companies may only be allowed one brand name
sponsorship within a twelve-month period, such as the Virginia Slims
tennis tournaments, although, they may have multiple games played in
different states throughout the year.15'
Much criticism has been given to loopholes that seem to
undermine these advertising restrictions. 152 What are the practical
effects of some of these exceptions? One, for instance, is that the
prohibition on product placement in various media does not apply to
brand name sponsorships. 53 For example, tennis players or race car
drivers can be paid by the tobacco industry to endorse permitted
tobacco brand name sponsored events. 54  Secondly, limitations on
tobacco product merchandising do not apply to merchandise promoting
a brand name sponsorship if sold at the sponsored event (e.g., Winston
Cup logos on merchandise at Winston Cup NASCAR racing events can
be distributed by R.J. Reynolds). 55 Thirdly, limitations on outdoor
advertising do not always apply in the context of brand name
sponsorship. As an illustration, Winston Cup racing billboards could be
advertised for 100-day stretches at multiple locations across the
country. 156 Marketing areas left untouched by the MSA include direct
mail, tobacco retailer activities, bars and nightclubs, point-of-sale
advertising, and tobacco sales over the internet.15
7
F. Tobacco companies and advertising
Cigarettes are the most widely advertised product in the world, and,
prior to the MSA, pervaded all comers of the U.S. market.1 58 The year
the MSA was signed, tobacco companies spent nearly $7 billion-more
than $18 million per day--on cigarette advertising and promotion. 159
Prior to the crackdown on tobacco advertising, it was nearly impossible
to drive down a freeway or sit at a bus stop without seeing a cigarette
1511d.
152Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y
267, 293 (2003); Kline, supra note 17, at 626.
153Id. at 627.
154 Id.
15 5Kline, supra note 17, at 627.
156 Id. at 628.
117Id. at 632.
158Hahn, supra note 27, at 1033.
159National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Preventing
Tobacco Use, at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr2000/factsheets/factsheet-advertising.htm (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004).
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billboard or advertisement.' Cigarette ads account for a large
proportion of the advertising pages, although today some tobacco
companies, such as Philip Morris, have stated that they do not advertise
in magazines with more than 15% youth readership. 16 1 According to a
June 2003 report by the American Lung Association, as cigarette sales
decline in this country, expenditures on tobacco advertising and
promotion have increased. 162 In 1982, when cigarette sales were at
632.5 billion cigarettes, the industry spent about 1.8 billion dollars on
advertising on promotion.' 63 By 2000, when sales were reduced to
413.5 billion cigarettes, advertising and promotion had increased 5.3
times. 164 The most current figure on tobacco advertising and promotion
reported by the Federal Trade Commission is 9.6 billion dollars spent
by tobacco companies in 2000, the most ever reported by the
industry.
165
Why such heavy regulations on tobacco marketing? The impact
of tobacco advertising on usage, particularly youth smoking, has been
the subject of extensive debate for the past several decades. 166 The
public health community asserts that advertising encourages smoking
and is a significant influence on the initiation of smoking among
youth. 167  The tobacco industry, on the other hand, maintains that
cigarette advertising is a form of competition and simply affects the
market share.1 68  The industry also argues that advertising provides
useful information to smokers about their products, including
information on tar and nicotine content.
69
Studies exist proving and disproving the idea that advertising
leads to an increase in smoking.' 70  On the anti-tobacco advertising
front, the Center for Disease Control reports that the effect on tobacco
advertising on young people is best epitomized by R.J. Reynolds
160Hahn, supra note 27, at 1033.
161See Philip Morris USA, at http://www.pmusua.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
162AM. LUNG ASS'N, Trends in Tobacco Use 4 (2003), at http://www.lungusa.org.
163Id.
164Id.
165FED. TRADE COMM'N, CIGARETTE REP. FOR 2000 (2002), available at
http://www.lungusa.org. While substantial decreases were reported for outdoor and
transit advertising, increases in expenditures for promotional allowances and retail
value (e.g., ads at retail locations and payments made to retailers to facilitate sales)
account for the overall rise in spending. Id.
166Hahn, supra note 27, at 1034.
167Id.
168Id.
169 Id.
"OlId. at 1035.
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Company's introduction of the "Joe Camel" campaign.1 7 1 It claims
that, with the introduction of the "Old Joe" cartoon character in 1988,
Camel's share of the adolescent market increased dramatically from
less than 1 percent share before 1988 to more than 13 percent in
1993.72 Additionally, some research has demonstrated a strong link
between tobacco promotion and the decision among adolescents to
begin smoking. 73 The Federal Trade Commission reported in 1998
that research showed that young children regard and recognize tobacco
advertising images in a positive manner. 174  Sales statistics may
demonstrate a connection between tobacco advertising and popularity.
For example, about 85% of adolescent smokers who buy their own
cigarettes buy Marlboro, Newport, or Camel-the three most heavily
advertised brands of cigarettes in the United States.
75
Another study by Eugene Lewit, "The Effects of Governmental
Regulation on Teenage Smoking," used data collected from about 6700
youth from ages twelve to seventeen, taken from 1966 through 1970.176
"Based on measures of televised cigarette advertising and counter-
advertising, and self-reported information of time spent watching
television, Lewit and his colleagues estimated the number of pro- and
anti-smoking commercials each youth would have seen. Their estimates
provide support for the hypothesis that televised pro-smoking
advertisements significantly increased youth smoking."'
77
On the other side, there are mixed results. In 1989, some
econometric studies, mostly from the United States and United
Kingdom, explored the relationship between cigarette advertising and
promotional expenditures and cigarette demand. 178 These studies have
generally produced mixed findings, with most studies concluding that
advertising has, at most, a small positive impact on demand. 17
9
"However, critics of these studies note that econometric methods,
which estimate the impact of a marginal change in advertising
17 National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, supra note
159.172Id.
173Kline, supra note 17, at 621.
174Id.
175See National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, supra
note 159.176Hahn, supra note 27, at 1035.17 7Id.
178Id.
1791d.
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expenditures on smoking, are ill-suited for studying the impact of
advertising."' 
80
Studying the impact of advertising and promotion bans on
cigarette smoking, some researchers have hypothesized, would provide
more direct evidence on the impact of tobacco advertising. 81 Some
older studies examined the impact of the U.S. television ban on
cigarette advertising that began in 1971.182 Those studies concluded
that the ban did not significantly reduce cigarette smoking in the U.S. 1
83
However, one might consider that the tobacco industry can shift its
resources from the banned media source-television, for example-to
alternative measures which are not banned, such as magazines or point-
of-sale. 1
84
The debate between tobacco advertising and subsequent usage
continues and is yet to be settled. Overall, there appears to be no
"smoking gun that proves that advertising and promotion play a
significant role in expanding or maintaining the market for tobacco
products, or that they do not."'1 85 Analyzing the evidence collectively,
Kenneth Warner, who has studied the links between cigarette
advertising and public health, has "characterized the extent of the
influence of advertising as unknown and possibly unknowable."'
8 6
II. TRENDS IN TOBACCO LITIGATION
According to litigation scholars, litigation occurred in three waves.
87
The first occurred from 1954 to 1973 and the second from 1983 to
1992.188 These first two waves predominantly consisted of individuals
suing the tobacco companies for negligence. 189  In those cases,
"litigation was intended to impose damages for the harms caused to
individuals by the tobacco industry."'  With the exception of one
case, all of these cases lost because jurors accepted the industry
arguments on the individual freedom to smoke-knowing the risks and
1801d.
18
'Hahn, supra note 27, at 1035.182Id.
183Id.
184 Id. at 1037.
'
85Id. at 1038.
186Hahn, supra note 27, at 1038.
187Jacobson, supra note 2, at 229.
1881d.
1891d"
1901d.
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choosing to smoke anyway. 19' The third wave of litigation, beginning
in 1994, has included individual lawsuits, but class actions have
prevailed with multi-million and billion dollar awards for large groups
of people claiming to suffer common injuries.1 92 "Under pressure from
public health advocates, the focus of litigation shifted more toward
securing public policy changes."'' 93  Since the landmark settlement
in1998, where has tobacco litigation gone and what kinds of suits have
arisen since then?
This article discusses five major trends of post-MSA litigation:
1) challenges to the MSA itself; 2) federal government suits; 3) cases
involving violations to the MSA by the tobacco company signatories;
4) major awards against the industry; and 5) suits to gain tobacco
settlement funds.
A. Challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement
Because of its many complex provisions and regulations, litigation has
arisen as a result of effectuating the MSA. 194 Within the first category
of challenges to the MSA are cases such as Grand River Enter. Six
Nations v. Pryor, which challenges provisions of the MSA.
195
Plaintiffs were tobacco companies that were non-signatories to the
MSA.196 Defendants were 31 states seeking reimbursement of costs for
treating tobacco-related medical conditions.1 97 Although the MSA was
only initially signed by the four major tobacco companies, referred to
as the Majors or Original Participating Manufacturers ("OPMs"), other
tobacco companies were permitted to participate as Subsequent
Participating Manufacturers ("SPMs").198 Thirty-six additional tobacco
companies did join as SPMs. 199 During settlement negotiations of the
MSA, the parties were concerned that Non-Participating Manufacturers
("NPMs") would take advantage of the fact that OPMs and SPMs were
subject to marketing restrictions and faced a significant price increase
to pay the cost of the settlement to increase their sales in the States. °°
19lid.
19 2Jacobson, supra note 2, at 229.
193Id.
194See Grand River Enters. Six Nations v. Pryor, No. 02 CIV.50681JFK, 2003 WL
22232974 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003).
195Id. at * 1.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198Id.
199Grand River Enters., at * 1.2001d, at *2.
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The participating manufacturers were concerned with the threat of a
significantly diminished market share, and the States feared that NPMs
could continue to produce serious tobacco-related health care costs
while avoiding liability.20 1  To resolve these concerns, the MSA
requires each signatory state to enact "Qualifying Statutes. 2 °2 States
that chose not to enact these Qualifying Statues would have their
portions of the settlement fund reduced.20 3
In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, the two Qualifying
Statutes at issue were the Escrow and Certification statues.20 4 The
Escrow Statute required each NPM to establish and fund an escrow
account in an amount determined by the manufacturer's sales
volume.20 5 The Certification Statute prohibited the sale of cigarettes in
a state by companies that fail to comply with the Escrow Statute.20 6
The plaintiffs in Grand River Enterprises Six Nations alleged that the
Statutes were unconstitutional under several theories, including
violation of federal anti-trust laws, and other claims including that the
Qualifying Statutes constitute a Civil Rights Violation. 20 7  The
plaintiffs, however, lost on all claims, the MSA's Qualifying Statues
were upheld, and the case was dismissed.20 8
Similarly, Star Scientific v. Beales upheld the Qualifying
Statutes.209 The courts in both cases compelled payment by the NPM
to the states and reaffirmed the MSA.2 ° There, Star Scientific, a
tobacco company that did not participate in the MSA, brought action
against the Attorneys General of Virginia, California, New York, the
American Lung Association, the American Cancer Society, and several
other groups.2 11 As a non-participating manufacturer, Star Scientific
sued to have Virginia's Qualifying Statutes declared unconstitutional
and the MSA declared an unconstitutional compact.21 2 The Court of
Appeals held that the statute requiring NPMs to contribute to healthcare
20 1 d.
202 Id.
203 Id.
2
°4Grand River Enters., at *2.205Id.
20 71d.
208Id. at 17.
2 09 Star Scientific v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2002). Star Scientific Incorporated
brought action against the Attorneys General of Virginia, New York, and most other
states. Id.
2 0 Grand River Enters., at * 17; Star Scientific, 278 F.3d 339.21 
'See Star Scientific, 278 F.3d 339.212Id. at 343.
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costs escrow fund was not in violation of Due Process, Equal
Protection, or Commerce Clauses and that the MSA was not an
unconstitutional encroachment upon federal supremacy in violation of
the Compact Clause.213
1. Anti-trust challenges
Another type of challenge to the MSA's existence are suits declaring
that the MSA violated anti-trust laws. Illustrating this trend are two
cases, PTI v. Philip Morris and Mariana v. Fisher.2 14 Judge Manella
opined in PTI, "This suit is one of a series of legal challenges to the
MSA and statutes passed in conjunction with it. To date, these suits
have been uniformly unsuccessful., 215  In PTI, the plaintiffs were
employed in the business of "cigarette re-entry and/or importation of
cigarettes into the United States" and sought to invalidate the MSA on
various constitutional and anti-trust grounds.216 As in prior suits, the
plaintiffs challenged the state Qualifying Statutes. 2 17 PTI alleged that
defendant violated the Interstate Compact Clause, the Import-Export
Clause, and alleged claims under California state law for a violation of
the Unfair Competition Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.218 The
court held that defendants were immune from plaintiffs anti trust
challenges to the MSA and Qualifying Statutes and dismissed all
claims.219
On the same anti trust claim front, plaintiffs in Mariana v.
Fisher were smokers seeking injunctive relief from the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania and Secretary of Revenue for the "continued
implementation, enforcement, and performance of the MSA on behalf
of Pennsylvania." 220  Plaintiffs claimed they did not seek relief as
smokers, but represented the legal interests of SPMs and NPMs.221 In
addition to constitutional claims (i.e., Commerce clause), plaintiffs
argued that the MSA violated the Sherman Act, acting as an output
cartel.222 The court found no constitutional violations in the MSA.2 2 3
2 13Id.
214 PTI v. Philip Morris, 100 F.Supp.2d 1179 (C.D. 2000); Mariana v. Fisher 338 F.3d
189 (3rd Cir. 2003).215PTI, 100 F. Supp.2d at 1185.216Id. at 1186.
217Id.
218Id. at 1187.
219 d. at 1209.220Mariana, 338 F.3d at 194.221Id. at 206.
22Id. at 195.
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In regard to the anti trust claims, the court held that the defendants were
entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which states
that parties are immune from liability arising from the antitrust injuries
caused by government action resulting from petitioning of the
government. 2 24  The court concluded that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine applied to the defendants as state actors because they
petitioned the courts and legislature in order to advance the goals of
Pennsylvania residents.225
2. Inadequate representation of group interests
The MSA has also been challenged broadly by groups that argue the
agreement did not meet their interests.226 For example, in Table Bluff
Reservation v. Philip Morris, nineteen Indian Tribes sued the
Defendants, which included Philip Morris and other tobacco company
signatories, on the grounds that the settlement violated their tribal
sovereignty, equal protection, the Privileges and Immunity Clause, and
others rights. 22  As an equal protection claim, the "Tribes also assert
injury in that they were unlawfully excluded from the negotiations
leading up to and the execution of the MSA, as well as from the
benefits provided for in the agreement." 228 Furthermore, the Tribes
complained that the MSA gave the courts of the settling states
"exclusive jurisdiction over disputes regarding compliance with the
MSA and gives the state Attorneys General enforcement powers, thus
forcing the Tribes into state court and allowing state law enforcement
on tribal lands." 229 The court disagreed and concluded that the Tribes
could not show injury by exclusion from the MSA, nor would they be
22Id. at 206.
224Mariana, 338 F.3d at 206.225Id. "In Hise v. Phillip Morris Inc., plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of
themselves and consumers of tobacco products alleging that the defendants, a group
of tobacco manufacturers, unlawfully agreed to raise tobacco prices in order to pay
the costs of settling a lawsuit brought against the manufacturers by over 40 states to
recover public health costs. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the tobacco
companies' joint negotiation and execution of a master settlement agreement with the
plaintiff states violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, in part, on the grounds that the joint negotiation and execution of
the agreement "is protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as conduct incident
to litigation." James R. Atwood, Securing and Enforcing Patents: The Role of Noerr-
Pennington, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 651, 664 (2001).226Table Bluff Res. v. Philip Morris, 256 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2001).
227Id. at 881.
2 28Id at 883.
2291d.
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forced into state courts and then under state jurisdictional laws.230 To
the Tribes' allegation that their smokers would have to pay higher
cigarette prices without corresponding financial compensation, the
court held that state settlement funds included the Indian population of
that area and that Plaintiffs were unable to show injury from failure to
receive payments under the MSA.23 1
In a similar vein of group exclusion, Forces Action Project, a
smokers' rights organization, sued the Attorney General of California
and four major tobacco companies in Forces Action Project v.
California.232 Though the opinions over the course of this case have
remained relatively vague, it is clear that Plaintiffs sought to invalidate
the MSA initially on the grounds of equal protection and due process
violations.233 Forces Action Project then sought to amend their
complaint on anti-trust grounds that the Defendants were operating an
output cartel and controlling cigarette prices in violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1-7.234 In its most recent
unpublished opinion, the court concluded that Plaintiffs presented no
new facts, but only new theories, and failed to develop earlier
theories.235 The court affirmed denial of the motion to amend the
complaint. This line of cases demonstrates that all group interests may
not have been included in the final settlement of the MSA; nonetheless,
they have thus far been unsuccessful in their attempts to invalidate it.236
3. Advertising challenges
The next line of cases represents challenges of the MSA due to the
advertising regulations and their effects upon the industry. Two
illustrating cases are Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly and American
Legacy Foundation v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.237 "In Lorillard Tobacco
v. Reilly, decided in 2001, the Court addressed for the first time the
constitutionality of state restrictions on retail tobacco advertising." 238
Just a few months after the MSA was signed, the Attorney General of
Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the
230 1d.
231Table Bluff Res., 256 F.3d at 884-85.232Forces Action Project v. California, 57 Fed. Appx. 322 (9th Cir. 2003).233See id.234Id. at 323.
2 35 1d.
236Id.
237Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Am. Legacy Found. v.
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 831 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 2003).238Hoefges, supra note 152, at 269.
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advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. 239 For
instance, the regulations prohibited any "outdoor advertising" for
cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars located within a one thousand
foot radius of any school or playground. 240  The regulations also
required point-of-sale advertising to be placed five feet or higher in
retail operations that allowed children.241 "These regulations acted to
close loopholes in the Master Settlement Agreement that allowed
outdoor and point-of-sale tobacco advertising on the property of
tobacco retailers."
242
Subsequently, a coalition of tobacco manufacturers including
Lorillard, Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson, and R.J. Reynolds,
contested these state regulations and asserted that they violated the First
Amendment and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA).14' The FCLAA contains federal pre-emption provisions that
prohibit states from enacting warning requirements for packaging or
"advertising or promotion" of cigarette products covered by the
244FCLAA. The Supreme Court also examined the extent to which the
First Amendment protects tobacco advertising and applied the Central
Hudson commercial speech test.245 After much analysis, the Supreme
Court struck down Massachusetts' regulations limiting outdoor and
retail point-of-sale tobacco advertising and held that the FCLAA pre-
empts those state regulations.
246
239Tobacco: State Limits on Tobacco Ads Struck Down on Preemption, First
Amendment Grounds 2003, BUREAU NAT'L AFF.24 0Hoefges, supra note 152, at 293.241 Id.
242Id.
243 Id.
244Id. at 286. See also Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, supra note 82.245Kerri L. Keller, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends the
First Amendment Guarantees Up in Smoke by Applying the Commercial Speech
Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REv. 133, 135 (2002). "Even
though First Amendment protection of commercial speech began with Virginia
Pharmacy, it was not until the landmark case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission of New York that the commercial speech doctrine
became well established. The importance of Central Hudson lies in the fact that the
Court decided intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for commercial speech. The
Court articulated a four-prong test that balanced the government's interests with the
interests that are served by the commercial speech. First, the speech must not be
misleading or related to unlawful activity. Second, the government must have a
substantial interest in regulating the speech. Third, the regulation must directly serve
the substantial interest. Finally, the regulation must be no more extensive than
necessary." Id.24 6Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001).
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Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly has since been the subject of much
scholarly debate.247  "Lorillard demonstrates that while tobacco
companies may be willing to join the fight against youth smoking, they
are not willing to give up their First Amendment rights" 248  The
decision affected the movement towards tobacco regulation by the
legislature and had an impact on the lower courts.2 4 9 Soon after its
decision, federal legislators began seeking to grant the FDA regulatory
authority over tobacco. 250 A month after its decision, a Utah Court
struck down state regulations banning most liquor advertising in Utah,
and Chicago voluntarily repealed an ordinance generally prohibiting
outdoor advertising for alcohol and cigarettes.
12 5
The heavy tobacco advertising regulations came up to bat again
in American Legacy Foundation v. Lorillard Tobacco CO. 2 5 2  As
discussed earlier, part of the settlement provided for the creation and
funding of a foundation whose mission is to educate young people
about the harms associated with tobacco use and to reduce youth
tobacco use. 253 Within this agreement, signatories agreed to certain
restrictions in regard to the content of the foundation's educational
programs.254 The specific restriction at issue in this case is that that the
foundation (ALF) would not engage in the "vilification" or "personal
attack" of the tobacco companies or their executives. 255 ALF engaged
in several successful print, radio, and television campaigns, such as
Florida's "The Truth., 256 ALF's anti youth-smoking ads vehemently
accused "Big Tobacco" and tobacco executives of deceiving the public
and often portrayed them in a less than favorable light.257
Subsequently, one of the tobacco manufacturers threatened to sue ALF
for allegedly violating the anti-vilification provisions provided for in
the MSA and the foundation's by-laws.258
24 78ee Keller, supra note 245; Jennifer Kraft Green, The Newest Schoolyard Bullies:
Joe Camel, the Marlboro Man, and the FCLAA after Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
34 Rutgers L. J. 765 (2003).248Keller, supra note 245, at 135-36.249Hoefges, supra note 152, at 302.25 01d. at 305.
2511d. at 303-304.
252Am. Legacy Found., 831 A.2d 335.253Id. at 337.
254 Id.
2551d.
25 6 See CrazyWorld Find Facts, supra note 29.25 7Id.
258Am. Legacy Found., 831 A.2d at 337.
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For fear of the tobacco companies filing in several jurisdictions,
ALF made a pre-emptive strike by suing first; it sought declaratory
judgment that Defendant had no standing to sue the foundation based
on the MSA and the foundation's bylaws. 5 Furthermore, ALF
attempted to protect itself for the future by seeking to bar the Defendant
from ever suing the foundation under the MSA or the bylaws. 260 The
Court did not grant ALF shelter from liability and "decided in favor of
the defendant tobacco company with respect to its ability to sue the
foundation under a contract theory based on the settlement
agreement." 261  The Court reasoned that the foundation expressly
adopted the MSA and accepted its benefits with knowledge of its terms;
the anti-vilification provision existed in both the bylaws and the
MSA.
262
B. Suits by the federal government
The second major line of cases involves suits by the federal
government against the tobacco companies. Why should the states be
the only ones to benefit from the tobacco companies' recovery
payments? For the federal government, taking on the tobacco industry
was a sizable undertaking requiring both financial resources and
political support, which was unsteady at the time of administration
change and impeachment hearings.263 In September 1999, Attorney
General John Ashcroft, on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ"), filed a lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers to recover
health care expenditures that the federal government paid or will pay
for treating tobacco-related illnesses.26  In addition to seeking
monetary recovery, the government sought to enjoin the tobacco
companies "from engaging in fraudulent and other unlawful conduct
and to order Defendants to disgorge the proceeds of their past unlawful
activity.265
1. Attempts at federal recovery
The federal government asserted claims under three federal statutes: the
Medical Care Recovery Act ("MCRA"), the Medicare Secondary Payer
2591d.
2601d.
261Id.
262Am. Legacy Found., 831 A.2d at n.73.
263 Tobacco: Ashcroft Memo Seeks Executive Assistance in DOH's Lawsuit Against
Tobacco Industty 2001, BUREAU NAT'L AFF.264united States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000).2 65Id.
[VOL.8.3:615
TOBACCO LITIGATION
("MSP") provisions of the Social Security Act, and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 26 6 The first two
claims were dismissed.267 In the September 2000 case of United States
v. Philip Morris Inc., the court dismissed the federal government's
claims under the MCRA, stating: "The congressional intent in enacting
MCRA in 1962-at which time Medicare did not exist and the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Act ("FEHBA") was still in its infancy-
was to provide a means for the Government to recover from third-party
tortfeasors' medical expenses it had furnished for (primarily military)
employees." 268 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend that
the MCRA be used as a recovery mechanism for Medicare or FEHBA
costs.
269
In 2001, the court next addressed the federal claims under the
MSP in United States v. Philip Morris Inc.270 The Court reasoned that
tobacco companies were not "self-insured" entities within the meaning
of MSP provisions.27' The MSP provisions state that Medicare is a
secondary payer when another entity is required to pay under a primary
272plan, including a self-insured plan, for an individual's health care.
Thus the government failed to state a claim under the MSP
provisions. Despite the failure to succeed under the first two
266 Tobacco: Ashcroft Memo Seeks Executive Assistance in DOH's Lawsuit Against
Tobacco Industry, supra note 263. The first statute, the Medical Care Recovery Act
("MCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653, "provides the Government with a cause of
action to recover certain specified health care costs it pays to treat individuals injured
by a third-party's tortious conduct (Count 1). The second statute is a series of
amendments referred to as the Medicare Secondary Payer provisions ("MSP"), 42
U.S.C. § 1395y, which provides the Government with a cause of action to recover
Medicare expenditures when a third-party caused an injury requiring treatment and a
"primary payer" was obligated to pay for the treatment (Count 2). The third statute is
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (Counts 3 and 4), which provides parties with a cause of action to recover
treble damages due to injuries they received from a defendant's unlawful racketeering
activity, and to seek other equitable remedies to prevent future unlawful acts." United
States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000).267United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, (D.D.C. 2000); United
States v. Philip Morris Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001).268 Philip Morris, supra note 267, at 135.269Id.
270 Philip Morris Inc., supra note 267 at 1.27lId. at 4.
272 Id 
.271 Id. at 4-5.
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statutes, the district court did permit the DOJ to pursue claims under
RIco.
274
While still pursuing the federal litigation, Ashcroft also opened
the door to settlement negotiations with the tobacco companies, seeking
a "mutually agreeable settlement., 275  Although President Bush
supported Ashcroft's recommendations for settlement, it received much
criticism by anti-tobacco activists and members of Congress, including
allegations that the tobacco industry's chief goal was to stop the
litigation through political election contributions to Republicans.
276
"The settlement is intended to be a sweetheart deal for the tobacco
industry," said Mike Myers, president of Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids.2T" Paul Gallagher, a leading tobacco litigation attorney, stated
"the government is clearly protecting the interest of the cigarette
manufacturers over the interest of individuals who have been defrauded
and harmed by the tobacco's 50-year conspiracy., 278 Illinois Senator
Richard Durbin also commented on the federal government's legal
strategies: "...by not seeking full funding for the lawsuit from
Congress, the Department [of Justice] is not preparing to go to
trial.. .by downplaying its chances at winning, the Department is
inviting the tobacco companies to be less than forthcoming during
negotiations. 2
79
Due to all the condemnation of federal negotiations with the
tobacco industry, a settlement was not reached at that time.280 The
federal government continues to pursue recovery under RICO statutes
seeking injunctive relief and damages for "an unlawful conspiracy to
deceive the American public." 28  The government's complaint
described a four-decade long conspiracy, beginning in 1953, by
defendant tobacco manufacturers to intentionally mislead the public as
to whether smoking causes disease. 282 It further alleges that defendants
published false articles, issued deceptive press releases, and concealed
and destroyed documents indicating the correlation between smoking
274 Tobacco: Bush Agrees with Ashcroft Plans for Tobacco Settlement, Fleischer Says,
2001, BUREAU NAT'L AFF.275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
2 78 Id.
279Tobacco: Bush Agrees with Ashcroft Plans for Tobacco Settlement, supra note 274.
280See id.28
'Philip Morris Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
282Id.
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and disease and addictiveness of nicotine. 2 83  The court denied
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, which argued against the
Government's advertising, marketing, promotion and warning claims
because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission Acts (FTCA).284 The court explained that, although the
conduct alleged in the government's advertising, marketing, promotion,
and warning claims fell within the reach of these statutes, such overlap
was not sufficient to make the FTC's jurisdiction exclusive simply
because there was no inherent conflict or "positive repugnancy"
between RICO and the FTCA.285 The federal government's attempts
were not completely successful, however, as their cross-motion on the
Defendants' affirmative defenses was denied in part and granted in
part.286
2. Federal regulation and the FDA
The central focus of the federal government beyond recovery litigation
was, and still may be, securing regulation over tobacco through the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).287 The FDA, in 1996, asserted
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, concluding that nicotine is a
drug under FDA standards.288 In response to tobacco regulations
subsequently promulgated by the FDA under its newly asserted
authority, a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers
289filed a suit in 1999 challenging the FDA's regulations. Meanwhile,
Senators Kennedy and DeWine proposed bills allowing for a new
section in FDA jurisdiction for the regulation of tobacco products.29 °
As much political debate broiled over the FDA's authority to regulate
tobacco and "nicotine as a drug", the court in Food and Drug Admin. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. finally decided that Congress had
not granted the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products.29 1 The
court considered that when Congress contemplated the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.S. § 301) it had intended to exclude
2831d..
2841d. at 77.285Id. at 77-78.
286See id.287Kennedy, supra note 28.288Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000).2891d. at 125.
290See Kennedy, supra note 28.29 1See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 135.
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tobacco products from the FDA's jurisdiction.292 The court reasoned
that if tobacco products were within the FDA's jurisdiction, the Act
would require them to remove it from the U.S. market entirely. 293 This
ban would then contradict recent legislation, including the MSA.29 4
Thus, the court decided not to defer to the agency's expansive
construction of the statute, and maintained Congress' original intent to
295deny the FDA the power to regulate tobacco products.
C. Alleged MSA violations by the tobacco industry
The third string of post-MSA tobacco litigation involves alleged
violations to the MSA by the tobacco company signatories. Three
examples will be discussed here. 296  First, Attorney General Bill
Lockyer of California filed suit against RJR in People ex. rel. Lockyer
v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. for an alleged violation of an MSA
provision restricting outdoor advertising of tobacco products.297 After
attempts to settle the matter out of court, California brought this
litigation against R.J. Reynolds ("RJR") in 2001 to enforce the MSA
and obtain relief for its alleged violation of the MSA's restrictions on
outdoor advertising. 298  Within the MSA's extensive regulations
banning billboards and other outdoor advertising, RJR was permitted to
sponsor and promote its National Association for Stock Car Auto
Racing (NASCAR) Winston racing cup series as a "Brand Name
Sponsorship." 299 A dispute arose between the parties about whether, by
not removing some outdoor advertising signs mentioning Winston
located at Sears Point Raceway in northern California, RJR had
292Id. at 142.
291Id. at 135.
294Id. at 139.
2951Id. at 133, 160. "The potential for FDA regulation of tobacco products has largely
been resolved.. .The tobacco industry subsequently indicted its willingness to engage
in discussions with Congress regarding federal regulation of cigarettes with respect to
youth smoking. However, it is unlikely that individual companies would be in
agreement on what is reasonable with respect to FDA regulation based on their ability
to compete effectively in the marketplace." Bernhard H. Fischer, New Developments
in Securitization: Tobacco Settlements, 843 PRACTISING LAW INST. COM. LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1273, 1286 (2002).
2961t should be noted that while all the present examples involve the R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company (RJR), this does not imply that RJR is the only tobacco company
liable for infractions.297 People ex. rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 516 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003).2 98 Id.
2991d. at 520.
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violated the MSA's limitation on outdoor advertising. 3°  The court
needed to determine the meaning of "initial sponsored event" within
the outdoor advertising limitation of permitted signage 90 days before
the event and 10 days after the event. 30 1 If the first race in the twelve-
month series was considered the "initial sponsored event" of the Brand
Name Sponsorship as a whole, RJR could be allowed to put up
uninterrupted advertising from February through November. 30  The
court, however, disagreed with RJR's contentions and construed the
phrase "initial sponsored event" as applying to each location and not
the series as a whole. 30 3 Thus, the court held that RJR's signage
exceeded the time limitations set forth in the MSA.
304
R.J. Reynolds faced charges for alleged violations of the MSA
again in People ex. rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 30 5 There,
RJR was charged with violating the Master Settlement Agreement by
indirectly targeting youth in its tobacco advertising campaigns.
30 6
Between February 1999 and October 1999, RJR operated tents in
California where they distributed 108,155 free packs of cigarettes to
14,834 people at six various events, including the Long Beach Jazz
Festival and Pomona Raceway. 3 7 At the six events, licensed security
guards were stationed at the tent entrances and cigarettes were only to
be distributed to adults with IDs. 308 The Defendant argued that the
cigarette distribution fell within one of the MSA's safe harbor
provisions allowing the "distribution of free cigarettes on public
grounds leased for private functions where minors are denied access by
a peace officer or a licensed security guard., 30 9 The court ruled against
the tobacco company and, based on penalty provisos delineated in the
MSA, imposed a $14,826,200 fine on it.310 The fine was upheld on
appeal and not held excessive.
3 1
A final illustration of litigation regarding MSA violations by a
tobacco company signatory is State ex rel. Petro v. R.J. Reynolds
3001d. at 521.30 Lockyer, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 523.30 2Id.
103 Id. at 533.
304 Id.
305See Lockyer, 112 Cal. App. 4th at 1377.
306 See id.
307 Lockyer, 112 Cal. App. 4th at 1378.
308 Id.
309 1d.
3'Old. at 1384.
31
'Id. at 1397.
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Tobacco Company.312 On March 19, 2001, the Attorney General of
Ohio initiated a suit against RJR contending that the Defendant's
practice of buying advertising space on and distributing matchbooks,
where its Winston Brand logo is exhibited, violated section III
regarding Brand Name Merchandise outlined in the MSA.313 The state
argued that because distribution of the matchbooks was restricted solely
to Adult-Only facilities, it does not fall within that exception of the
MSA.314 The court interpreted the word "merchandise" within section
III to include brand name matchbooks "because they are tangible items,
with a utilitarian value, that are bought and sold in commerce." 315 The
court affirmed that the MSA prohibits the distribution by RJR of the
matchbooks imprinted with their brand names.316
D. Big Awards
The fourth major type of post-MSA tobacco litigation constitutes the
substantial damages cases where smokers have been awarded very high
sums of money through litigation. Some are often highly publicized
class actions, where a large group of smokers, their families, or others
affected by tobacco-related illnesses demand compensation from the
leading tobacco companies. 317 "...Since the late 1970s, there has been
an "unprecedented increase in both the amounts and the numbers of
punitive awards.. .in mass tort situations. ... As a result of this
phenomenon, it seems the purpose of punitive damages awards is
progressing from punishment to annihilation., 318  This category of
cases is quite large and a few cases are illustrative here. For instance,
in February 1999, "a jury awarded Patricia Henley $1.5 million in
compensatory damages and $50 million (later reduced to $25 million)
in punitive damages" in Henley v. Philip Morris Inc.319 Henley, a
Marlboro smoker for thirty-five years, brought an action for personal
injuries sustained based on allegations of Philip Morris' tortious
312State ex rel. Petro v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 152 Ohio App. 3d 345 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003).
1 13Id. at 347.
114Id. at 348.315Id. at 352-353.
316Id. at 354.
317See Crowley, supra note 24.
38Id. at 1514. This category of cases constitutes a vast number of cases, too
voluminous to cover comprehensively.319Jacobson, supra note 2, at 231. See Henley v. Philip Morris Inc., 112 Cal. App. 4th
198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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misconduct in the making and manufacturing of cigarettes. 320 The jury
found that the tobacco industry, including Defendant, "agreed to act
together to counter mounting scientific evidence about the health risks
of cigarette smoking... they launched a concerted public relations
campaign to deny any link between smoking and serious illness.,
321
Henley's award was followed by several other large damages
cases. 322 "In William-Branch v. Philip Morris, a jury in March 2001
awarded the plaintiff $8 million in compensatory damages and $79.5
million (later reduced to $32 million) in punitive damages., 323 Also in
2001, a California jury awarded $3 billion dollars in an individual
smoker suit by Richard Boeken against Philip Morris. 324 Since then,
the Boeken punitive damage award has since been reduced to $100
million and Philip Morris continues to appeal the case. 325 In a
California tobacco-asbestos synergy case, the jury found against
defendant tobacco companies, R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris, and
awarded $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in
32632punitive damages. Both companies have appealed the award.327 In
Jones v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., the plaintiff, a forty year smoker
developed lung cancer and sued RJR in a wrongful death action. 328 The
Florida jury found against RJR for approximately $200,000 in
compensatory damages, but no punitive damages.329 A motion for new
trial was granted.33 °
A landmark damage award is Engle class action where a Florida
jury awarded a staggering $145 billion in punitive damages in July
2000.33 1 The Engle case was a class action lawsuit, certified in 1994,
brought by individual smokers against several major tobacco
companies, including the Majors.332 During its several phases, the trial
focused on the individual conduct of the plaintiffs and then the
32°Henley, supra note 319 at 205.321Id. at 207.
3228ee Jacobson, supra note 2.3231Id. at 231.
324 Fischer, supra note 295 at 1283. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., BC 226593,
2001 WL 1894403 (Cal. Superior Aug. 9, 2001).325 Id.
326 Jacobson, supra note 2, at 231.
327 Id.
3288ee Jones v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 830 So. D. 854, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).329 Jacobson, supra note 2, at 231.33°Id.
33 1See id.
332 Crowley, supra note 24 at 1521.
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defendants' conduct separately. 333 Nearly two years after the start of
the trial, the jury set a U.S. record by awarding the largest personal
injury award in history.334 The tobacco companies appealed the
colossal award to no avail, despite that the judge admitted, "at first
blush, a $14[5] billion punitive damage[s] award seems so far outside
the comprehension of any reasonably thinking person..."
335
E. Getting a piece of the "settlement pie"
The final category of cases consists of a wide array of individual and
class actions that have cropped up in the wake of the MSA comprised
of people attempting to attain a piece of the settlement pie or collect
from the tobacco industry. Because the cases in this category are so
numerous, this discussion will be limited in order to display a sampling
of the existing cases. First, individual Medicaid recipients suffering
from tobacco-related illnesses tried to compel distribution of their
state's share of the MSA in Cardenas v. Anzai, Villagrana v. Graham,
and Arnold v. Kentucky.336 The Medicaid beneficiaries were largely
unsuccessful in collecting MSA money, as courts pointed out that
provisions in the MSA specifically precluded them from
reimbursement.337
Other groups tried to collect directly from the tobacco industry.
A group of Washington hospitals brought anti-trust, RICO charges, and
other state claims against the tobacco industry to recover
reimbursement for treating patients suffering from tobacco-related
illnesses in Association of Washington Public Hospital Districts v.
Philip Morris Inc. 338 The court, however, dismissed all claims, holding
that the hospitals lacked anti-trust and RICO standing and that
Defendants' alleged unlawful conduct was not the proximate cause of
the districts' injuries.33 9 Recently, a California prisoner sued three
major tobacco companies alleging that defendants' tobacco products
"caused him serious physical and mental addiction; pain & suffering;
chronic headaches; emotional distress; mental anguish..." while in
333Id. at 1522.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336See Cardenas v. Anzai, 311 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2001); Villagrana v. Graham, No.
01-4023, 2003 WL 892896 (10th Cir. Mar. 6, 2003); Arnold v. Kentucky, 62 S.W.3d
366 (Ky. 2001).337See Cardenas, supra note 336; Villagrana, supra note 336; Arnold, supra note 336.338Association of Washington Public Hospital Districts v. Philip Morris Inc., 241 F.3d
696 (9th Cir. 2001).3391d.
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prison.340  "Plaintiff argues that he should not be charged with the
knowledge of his addiction because, as a 'criminal,' he is not a
reasonable person." 341 Here, too, the plaintiff was unsuccessful as his
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
342
Lastly, in Nwanze v. Philip Morris, a group of 434 plaintiff
prisoners were unsuccessful against the tobacco industry when they
claimed damages for exposure to excessive quantities of second-hand
tobacco smoke.343  Plaintiffs complained of Eighth Amendment
violations due to defendants allegedly conspiring with the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons to distribute and sell cigarettes to the
prison population with "deliberate indifference to the health risks".
344
The court responded, "The bulk of Nwanze's contentions on appeal are
meritless and repeat arguments." 345  These cases, though varied in
scope and nature, have been largely unsuccessful in collecting money
from the settlement pot or from the tobacco companies as the states did
in 1998.346
III. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction to examining the MSA
Indeed, the Master Settlement Agreement is a unique entity, given the
size its geographic scope and its method of enforcement (entering
individual consent decrees in each state or territory).347 Because the
MSA requires each state through its courts to enter into a consent
decree with the tobacco companies, the MSA relies upon those courts
to enforce the decrees of the individual states. 348 "These distinctive
qualities have made it difficult to identify an analytical framework for
critiquing the creation and content of the MSA. While some scholars
have begun to comment on the MSA, it has not been easy to find
34 0Taylor v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 03-0758MMC, 2003 WL 22416693 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 20, 2003).341Id. at *3.
342 1d.
343Nwanze v. Philip Morris Inc., 6 Fed. Appx. 98 (2d Cir. 2001).344 Id. at 100.
34 5Id.
346See Association of Washington Public Hospital Districts v. Philip Morris Inc., 241
F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 03-0758MMC, 2003 WL
22416693 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2003); Id.347Wood, supra note 9, at 599.
34 8Id.
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analyses that focus on any given set of similar criteria." 349 Thus far,
"no academic literature relies upon a common forum of established
content to evaluate the actual negotiation and substance of the
MSA. ,350
First, a fundamental question is whether-almost six years after
it was signed-the MSA achieved any of its goals.351 Initially, the
explicit goal of the states' Medicaid litigation had two goals: to obtain
damages and to change public health policy.352  Then the MSA
included provisions to address objectives that tobacco control
advocates had pushed for-restrictions on the industry's advertising
and more money for anti-smoking ads.353  At this point, it is still
difficult to discern whether policy shifts have occurred.354 One reason
is that the industry has not completely stopped marketing to youth.
355
Under some exceptions of the MSA discussed previously, certain types
of tobacco advertising continue to exist; thus, youth are still likely to be
exposed to tobacco marketing. 356  Additionally, violations have
occurred, as the litigation examined demonstrates. 357 "With regard to
the American Legacy Foundation's anti-smoking advertising campaign,
it is too early to determine what impact it might have. The campaign is
currently being evaluated. 358 However, tobacco prices are generally
higher now than before the MSA.359 "Over time, this should have the
desired effect of reducing smoking prevalence among adults, along
with reducing prevalence and incidence rates among children."
360
"On balance, it appears fair to say "as an initial assessment that the
agreement has achieved some positive public health policy goals, but no
major breakthroughs. To the extent that the public health advocates are
able to convince states to allocate more of the settlement money to
tobacco control activities, the agreement could still prove to be a
significant event in changing tobacco policy. Whatever its
shortcomings, however, there is no question that these gains would not
349Id. at 600.
35Od. at 599.35 1See Jacobson, supra note 2, at 229.352 Id.
353Id.
354 1d.
35 51d.356Jacobson, supra note 2, at 229.
35 7See State, supra note 312 at 345; Philip Morris Inc., supra note 264 at 135; Henley
v. Philip Morris Inc., 112 Cal. App. 4th 198, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).358Jacobson, supra note 2, at 229.3591d.
36°Id"
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have been achieved absent the states' Medicaid litigation. The industry
had been in no hurry to negotiate with tobacco control advocates, and
certainly would not have voluntarily disclosed damaging internal
documents. 36'
B. Has tobacco litigation increased or decreased since the MSA?
From 1954 to 1994, individuals filed 813 claims against tobacco
companies, winning only twice and both cases were reversed on
appeal.362  A very different picture is evident today.363  "Litigation
against tobacco manufacturers has increased markedly in the past
several years..."364 This article examines the litigation statistics from
two major tobacco manufacturers, Philip Morris and RJR, which
account for 75% of domestic cigarette manufacturing and
consumption. According to reports filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission, 30 cases were pending against RJR in October
1994 . This was followed by 89 total cases pending a year later.367
Then in 1996, litigation climbed to 277 cases pending against RJR.36 8
Less than one year after the MSA, this number jumped to 620 cases
pending in June 1999.369 This number dipped momentarily to 535
cases pending against RJR in 2000, but rebounded to 1,680 total cases
pending in June 2001. 3 70 Examining the litigation statistics, tobacco
litigation has generally been on the rise since the MSA was signed.371
Another leading tobacco manufacturer, Philip Morris,
demonstrates a similar trend in its litigation statistics. In the heat of the
tobacco war-two years prior to the MSA-Philip Morris had 278 total
cases pending against it (consisting of health care cost recovery,372
individual smoking, and class action). In 1997, the number of total
cases pending against Philip Morris increased to 530. 373 One month
after the MSA was signed in 1998, Philip Morris faced 665 cases
36 1Id. at 230.
3 62 1d.
363Jacobson, supra note 2, at 231.
3641d. at 230.
3651d. at 228.
36 6Id. at 230.
3671d,
368Jacobson, supra note 2, at 230.36 9Id.
37 01d.
37 1See id.37 2Jacobson, supra note 2, at 230.37 3Id.
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pending. 374 Similar to RJR, the number of cases pending against Philip
Morris dropped down to 490 in the year 2000. 375 The number of
pending cases against Philip Morris escalated in 2001 to a whopping376
1,580. A January 2004 Security Exchange Commission filing report
indicates that the number of "individual smoking and health" cases
against Philip Morris remained steady at 250 cases pending in 2001 and
2002, but swelled to 423 as of December 31, 2003. 377 Interestingly, it
appears that class actions and health care cost recovery actions have
dropped slightly.378 However, the number of cases in a new category
of tobacco suits over "Lights/Ultra Lights" doubled between 2002 and
2003.379
C. Shouldn't a settlement agreement "settle" litigation?
A settlement implies resolution-an agreement, an accord, an
understanding. Since it was a settlement of litigation between the states
and the tobacco companies, an implicit goal of the MSA arguably is a
reduction in tobacco litigation.380 However, tobacco litigation has
actually swelled since its signing in 1998.381 In fact, the MSA may
have further enraged the tobacco war due to its lack of specificity and
broad scope. 382 As discussed earlier, many cases arising from the MSA
dealt with alleged violations by the tobacco company signatories (i.e.,
People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco) which required
383contract interpretation of MSA provisions. Specificity of contract
provisions, such as what specific items constitute "merchandise" and
whether a popular racing series constitutes an "initial-sponsored" event,
could have prevented lengthy court battles over definitional terms. 384
Without clear definitions, tobacco companies or the states took the
liberty of interpreting the MSA for themselves and acting upon these
interpretations, which resulted in litigation.385
374 Id.
37 5Id.
376 Id.
377Notes to Consolidate Financial Statements, 2004 SEC. EXCH. COMM'N 47.378 Id.
3791d. This tobacco-related litigation includes class action suits alleging that the use of
the terms "Lights" and "Ultra Lights" constitutes deceptive and unfair trade practices.
Id.380See Federal News Service, supra note 6.381Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, supra note 25.382See Posner, supra note 10, at 1155.383See Lockyer, supra note 305 at 516.384See id.385See id
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A major failure of the MSA leading to this landslide of
reactionary litigation is caused in part by its lack of scope.386 Despite
its potential to be an agreement of far-reaching scope and depth, the
MSA is not a comprehensive document in terms of litigation
deterrence. This is exemplified by the federal government's attempts to
regulate the tobacco industry through the Food and Drug
387Administration. Federal regulation might have a greater impact on
reducing individual smoking and class action suits, including the recent
"Lights/Ultra Lights" litigation. 388 Just as many dangerous products,
such as guns and pharmaceutical drugs, are regulated, the regulation of
tobacco would lead to nationwide uniformity of its manufacturing,
distribution, sale, and use. 389 Regulation over tobacco could lead to
fewer tobacco-related suits.
390
The MSA also falls short by overlooking-or purposely
excluding--devices to control individual smoking and class action
suits, as well as exorbitant payments. 391 For instance, according to
SEC reports from January 1998, the "proposed Resolution", which
would later become the MSA, would have many positive effects on
litigation, including settling "health care cost recovery actions (or
similar actions brought by or on behalf of any governmental entity
other than the federal government)... smoking and health class actions
and all "addiction/dependence claims, and would bar similar actions
from being maintained in the future." 392 While the rights of individuals
to sue the tobacco industry would have been preserved, caps on
individual or aggregate judgments and settlements demonstrated that
the "proposed Resolution" had governmental aims to reduce
litigation. The 1997 national settlement proposal would have
imposed "a $1 billion cap on the amount the industry would be required
to pay individual smokers in any given year."394 Caps on monetary
3 86See Posner, supra note 10, at 1155.
387Kennedy, supra note 28.388See Margaret Gilhooley, Book Review: Tobacco Unregulated: Why the FDA
Failed, and What To Do Now A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle with a
Deadly Industry by David Kessler, 111 YALE L.J. 1179 (2002).389Kennedy, supra note 28, at 102.390See Gilhooley, supra note 388; Id.
39 1See Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 1998 SEC. ExCH. COMM'N 39.
"...the new agreement contained none of the immunity provisions from class action
litigation and punitive damages included in that earlier package." Robin L. Rabin, The
Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 340 (2001).392Notes, supra note 391.
393 Id. at 40.394DeBow, supra note 21, at 567.
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judgments could have deterred future tobacco litigation, such as
frivolous attempts to gain settlement funds or reach the industry's deep
pockets.395
A strong complaint against the MSA contributes to the
disturbing new trend of "regulation by litigation" which favors lawyers
and interest groups.39 6 Legislation and agency regulation may be more
appropriate vehicles for dealing with the tobacco industry.
397
Regulation has the traditional values of accountability and
transparency, as affected parties have the opportunity to lobby
legislators and regulators, and political leaders may be voted out of
office for their role in the desired or undesired legislative choices.
398
The MSA, a litigator-created document, has been faulted for
encouraging this new trend of "regulations as litigation". 399 Private
litigation not only floods the courts dockets, "but by its nature" "does
not adequately address public health concerns, and therefore, will not
create a comprehensive national tobacco policy. 400  Other
commentators go further in criticizing the reliance on litigation as a
form of governmental paternalism. 40' Concern for judicial paternalism
over personal choices lead one scholar to state: "No one should mourn
the death of Joe Camel. But we should not allow our glee over his
demise to blind us to the dangers of making the government the
guardian of our private life and the judiciary the guardian of our public
life." 40
2
Other criticism focuses on the financial stakes in the MSA. It
has been said that, "The states' legal crusade against the tobacco
industry will one day rank as one of the worst developments in
American public law in the twentieth century, unless legislators and
voters act to undo the mischief it has caused., 403  The tobacco
settlements in total will lead to the largest transfer of wealth as result of
litigation in history.40 4 It will be, and continues to be, financed by
405smokers paying higher prices for cigarettes. One week after the
395See id.396posner, supra note 10, at 1151.
397 1d.
398Id"
3991d.
40 LaFrance, supra note 1, at 188-89.
40
'Jacobson, supra note 2, at 226.
4 03See DeBow, supra note 21.404Id. at 564.
405 1d.
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details of the MSA were made public, the three largest tobacco
companies announced the increase of the wholesale price of
cigarettes. 40 6 This increase of 35 cents per pack has estimated to be
able to generate more than enough revenue for the tobacco companies
to finance their annual payment of $8 billion to the states under the
MSA. 40 7 Thus, it may be inaccurate to say that the tobacco industry
alone is paying $250 billion to the states because smokers, rather than
the industry, are paying, in part, future payments.4° In the MSA, the
tobacco industry consented to make payments out of future revenues in
return for protection against liability for Medicaid costs, past and
future. 409 According to one industry analyst, it was clearly designed to
shift most of the cost of the MSA to the smokers because of smokers'
relatively inelastic demand for cigarettes.410
The fiscal mandates of MSA have also been criticized because
states are not required to spend their allotments on tobacco
prevention.411 A 2003 study reported that "most states have failed to
adequately fund tobacco prevention and cessation programs despite the
overwhelming evidence that such programs not only reduce smoking
and save lives..., 412 In fact, three states-Michigan, Missouri, and
Texas-spend none of their tobacco settlement dollars on tobacco
prevention, opting instead to use funds on highway repairs or
scholarships.413 It has been commented that:
"The settlements may contain some of the worst public policy
agreements ever made, but the money is enormous. These funds will go
into states' general revenues and will, therefore, be up for grabs for any
purpose whatsoever... This means one thing: feeding frenzy. Everyone
who has ever had a thought of how to spend money will suggest it, for
everything from tax cuts, to schools, to filling potholes. '' 4
406Id. at 568.
407 Id.
408Posner, supra note 10, at 1145.
4 09 1d.
410DeBow, supra note 21, at 569.
411Se e Tobacco: States are Failing to Use Settlements to Fund Prevention Programs
Report says 2001, BUREAU NAT'L AFF.; Tobacco: Groups Criticize States' Use of
Funds From Settlement to Balance Their Budgets 2002, BUREAU NAT'L AFF.4 12AM. CANCER SOC. ET AL., SHOW US THE MONEY: A REPORT ON THE STATES'
ALLOCATION OF THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT DOLLARS 1 (2003).413Id. at 2.414Marshall B. Kapp, Tobacco Litigation, Round Three: It's the Money and the
Principle, 24 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y AND THE L. 811, 812 (1999).
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Tobacco control advocates are angered by the lack of settlement
dollars being used for tobacco control programs because they insist that
these programs are, indeed, effective. 4 5 In fact, the Center for Disease
Control released a statement on September 18, 2003 that a landmark
study analyzing cigarette sales data from all states and tobacco control
program expenditures finds that cigarette sales dropped more than
twice as much in states that spend more on comprehensive tobacco
control programs than in the United States as a whole.416
Tobacco scholar, W. Kip Viscusi, controversially argues that
state and federal governments do enjoy benefits, as well as incurring
costs, from the early mortality of smokers.4" 7
"Because smokers are sicker than other people, they require more
medical care; and because smokers die earlier than other people, they
cost more in life insurance and foregone payroll taxes. But because
smokers die earlier, they also don't need significant nursing home or
pension benefits.. .smokers are a "financial profit center" for
society.. .to the tune of $1.72 per pack, or tens of billions of dollars per
,,418year...
C. Counterarguments
The "Master Settlement Agreement between the tobacco industry and
the state attorneys general produced several important steps forward in
reducing the methods and media in which the tobacco industry can
advertise and target children., 419 The advertising restrictions would
have been difficult to accomplish without lengthy legal battles or the
settlement. 420 Others similarly assert that the MSA "could still prove to
4 1 5See Comprehensive Statewide Tobacco Prevention Programs Effectively Reduce
Tobacco Use, available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0045.pdf. (last visited Feb.
21,2004). In California, more than 1.3 million Californians have quite smoking
because of the California Tobacco Control Program. In the first three years of the
Florida comprehensive tobacco prevention program, from 1998 to 2001 (modeled on
programs in California and Massachusetts), current smoking declined by 47% among
middle school students and 30% among high school students. With its MSA funding,
Minnesota established a youth tobacco prevention program, and between 2000 and
2002, current cigarette use declined by 21% among middle school students and by
11% among high school students. Id.
4 16See http:///www.cdc.gov/od/cc/media/pressrel/rO309l8.htm (last visited Feb. 21.
2004).417posner, supra note 10, at 1146.
4 18Id.
4t9Kline, supra note 17, at 634.4201d.
[VOL.8.3:615
TOBACCO LITIGATION
be a significant event in changing tobacco policy" "to the extent that
public-health advocates are able to convince states to allocate more of
the settlement money to tobacco control activities."42'
"Whatever its shortcomings.. .there is no question that these gains
would not have been achieved without the states' Medicaid litigation.
The industry had been in no hurry to negotiate with tobacco control
advocates, and certainly would not have voluntarily disclosed
damaging internal documents. 422
Other scholars point out that another positive aspect of the MSA
is that the industry has been forced to raise prices to account for the
settlement. 423  "Over time, this should have the desired effect of
reducing smoking prevalence rates among adults, along with reducing
prevalence and incidence rates among children.
4 24
The MSA has also been praised for supporting public health in
America. 425 "The litigation has also taken place within a context in
which there has been a rising interest in the social costs of smoking.
4 26
The increase in litigation is not always seen as a negative consequence,
as some state that litigation can have a positive role in drawing public
attention to health problem.427 The rise in tobacco-related litigation is
not totally a negative consequence of the MSA according to some
scholars.428  "Tobacco litigation has demonstrated even more
dramatically how litigation may alter the political calculus.. .The
revelations about the industry's knowledge of nicotine's addictiveness
helped to alter public perceptions and make politicians more willing to
consider regulating tobacco sales. 4 29 Deterrence theory, from a tort
perspective, argues that the litigation, by imposing liability on tobacco
manufacturers, creates incentives to warn the public more adequately
about the health and addiction risks of smoking.
430
421Jacobson, supra note 2, at 230.4221d.
423Id.
424Id. at 229.425See Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of Affirmative
Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1663, 1677
(1999).426Viscusi, supra note 27.
427 Parmet, supra note 425 at 1695.4281d. at 1696.
4 29Id.
4 30 1d.
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Some say that it is not surprising that individuals concerned
about public health threats have turned to the courts. 4 3 1 For instance, in
the absence of any nationwide law guaranteeing tobacco-free
workplaces, "individuals harmed by environmental tobacco smoke
have had little choice but to go to court, using civil rights and common
law theories.' 432 While the rise in litigation may be understandable and
good for public awareness, the bottom-line remains that the Master
Settlement Agreement has failed to comprehensively address and
resolve individual and class action litigation against the industry.433
D. Litigation remains high
Despite the MSA's positive effects on advertising and release of
industry documents, the current litigation statistics make evident that
the MSA did not go far enough. The government did, in fact, recognize
the increasing litigation prior to the signing of the MSA, yet did not
implement measures to account for future deterrence.434 An SEC filing
on the overview of tobacco litigation from January 1998 acknowledged
"the substantial increase in the number of smoking and health cases...a
trend which accelerated in 1997." 435 At that time, the intentions
expressed for the "proposed resolution" (the MSA) were measures to
resolve "many of the regulatory and litigation issues affecting the
United States tobacco industry," such as caps on judgments and barring
smoking and health class actions.4 36 The lack of stringent mandates of
the MSA may be'partially responsible for not reducing the litigation
that followed.
Mandating expenditures aimed at tobacco control programs,
cessation or prevention, could have reduced litigation because potential
litigants may have been deterred from suing if they perceived that
efforts were being made by their state settlement funds to assist
them.437 Smoking cessation programs, for example, might assist a
long-time smoker in quitting instead of continuing the development of
a smoking-related disease, leading to a lawsuit for lung cancer.
Tobacco prevention programs for the future can impact litigation by not
only improving public health, but by preventing tobacco-related
43 1Parmet, supra note 425 at 1694.432Id.
433See Jacobson, supra note 2, at 230.434Rabin, supra note 391, at 340-341.435Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 1998 SEC. EXCH. COMM'N 39.436Id. at 34.
437 Rabin, supra note 391, at 341.
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diseases, which has led to the onslaught of "addiction"/dependence,
individual smoker, and class-action suits. 438 The stance that smoking is
a problem and that the states intend to make use of their settlement
dollars from the tobacco companies can demonstrate to the public that
the MSA was not simply a settlement in name, but a joint effort by the
states and the industry to assist residents with tobacco-related
problems, which eventually lead to litigation.439
Both the lack of stringent tobacco control measures with
settlement funds and an emphasis on monetary restitution indirectly
relates to the surge of litigation, because smokers are not deterred from
suing and they realize the amount of money available to them as a
result of smoking. Because no caps were included in the MSA, no
mandatory tobacco control spending by the states, and an emphasis on
vast quantities of monetary payments, litigation reduction could not be
achieved.44 0 An increase in litigation is disadvantageous for many
reasons, including being a financial drain on the judicial system,
clogging court dockets, discouraging amicable settlement, and
instigating future court battles. 441  Furthermore, the unprecedented
phenomenon of punitive awards in mass tort situations "is progressing
from punishment to annihilation. 4 42  Arguably, where "our world
thrives on job opportunities, consumer products and services, and the
revenue of large corporations, it would be in our nation's best interest
to protect corporate defendants, yet this has not occurred. ' 43 While the
tobacco industry does, indeed, produce a riskyProduct, a defendant's
wealth should not be the predominant factor. Moreover, some of
these major awards "may be close to crossing the line of constitutional
impropriety."
445
4381d.
439See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, COMPREHENSIVE STATEWIDE TOBACCO
PREVENTION PROGRAMS EFFECTIVELY REDUCE TOBACCO USE, available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org.
44°See Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 1998 SEC. EXCH. COMM'N 39.
44'See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-ABA CLE, CASE MANAGEMENT AND HEALTH
CLAIMS IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 140 (JANUARY 24-25, 2002). "There are serious
disadvantages to addressing public health risks on a piecemeal basis through
litigation." Jonathan B. Mosher, A Pound of Cause for a Penny of Proof: The Failed
Economy of an Eroded Causation Standard in Toxic Tort Cases, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 531, 537 (2003).
442Crowley, supra note 24, at 1514.
443Id. at 1515.
444Id. at 1513, 1517.
445Id. at 1515-1516.
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E. Recommendations for a second settlement
Because the tobacco war-both on the health and judicial fronts-has
not ceased since the signing of the MSA, a second settlement may be
able to address its failings. What recommendations for a second
settlement could improve public health and potentially reduce further
tobacco litigation? A second settlement might incorporate the
monetary caps on judgments and settlements discussed during the MSA
446
negotiations. In addition to imposing monetary chastisement upon
the tobacco companies, a primary focus of the 1998 MSA was the
advertising restrictions.4 4 7  Simply imposing further advertising
limitations on the tobacco companies, as many public health advocates
espouse, may not be the best solution because stricter restrictions edge
closer to violating the constitutional right to free speech.448 However, a
second settlement could promote counter advertising, zoning
regulations, laws concerning promotional samples, and regulations of
magazine sales.449 Furthermore, enforcement of minor access statutes
or conduct laws, such as restrictions on smoking in public places may
further the anti-tobacco effort. 450 An increase in tobacco excise taxes
may also prove to be successful because "this is an important
regulatory area for the states to take advantage of because increases in
the price of cigarettes reduce cigarette smoking, and youth are as
susceptible to price changes as adults. ' 45
1
Another proposal is to bar further health recovery cost,
"addiction"/dependence, individual, and class action suits once a more
comprehensive and expansive settlement has been reached.45 2  In
response to criticism against the loopholes allowing retailers to
advertise and market, a second agreement might exert financial control
on retailers to control minor access. 4 3 Retailers play a large role in
446See Notes, supra note 440.
447Kline, supra note 17, at 622.
448Jamie Peal Kave, The Limits of Police Power: State Action to Prevent Youth
Cigarette Use after Lorillard v. Reilly, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 214 (2002).
449Id. at 219.
4501d. at 216.
451Id. at 215. "Big Tobacco and poor smokers are like Siamese twins joined at the
spine. A slap to the evil twin stings also the one who had the small misfortune to
become addicted in the seventh grade. Given the unique bonds of dependency
between cigarette makers and cigarette users, great care should be used in designing
any new tobacco taxation scheme. The motivating principle should be to maximize
public health while minimizing pain to the addicted poor." Garner, supra note 8, at
29-30.452See id. at 34.
453 Kave, supra note 448 at 218.
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whether minors have access to cigarettes, so giving retailers an
incentive to refrain from selling to youth may prove effective.454 Final
suggestions are to incorporate a mandatory distribution plan of state
settlement dollars and, more radically, to fine tobacco companies if
youth smoking does not decrease that year by a predetermined
amount.
455
IV. CONCLUSION
Almost a contradiction in terms, the Master Settlement Agreement is
not a comprehensive, national accord that has diminished the tobacco
litigation war. While the MSA may have quelled the states' desire for
Medicaid reimbursement, the litigation statistics demonstrate that
tobacco litigation has been steadily climbing in the past six years.
456
The types of subsequent litigation, such as MSA enforcement and
stringent state advertising laws being struck down, demonstrate some
of the problems the MSA has brought forth, or has not reconciled and
addressed. In addition to the problem of increasing litigation, many
other tobacco-related issues have yet to be resolved.45
While some believe the MSA has yet to be as dominant a force
for policy change as expected, others comment positively that, "At a
minimum, the change in the culture of smoking based in part on
litigation is a very welcome development. ' '458 While the publicity of
the smoking problem is beneficial to public health awareness, increased
litigation is a financial drain on public resources, congests court
dockets, and has not solved the public health problem of smoking.
Thus, a second settlement is necessary to begin reducing this tobacco
litigation trend that has no sign of declining on its own in the near
future.
"In terms of the future prognosis for the tobacco industry, it is
clear that the industry did not buy peace with this settlement, but in fact
may have stimulated further litigation. 4 59 "The MSA was necessary,
then, not because it was adequate to public interest or proportionate to
the public need, but because litigation dynamics left no alternative. 46 °
454Id.
4551d. at 217-218.
456 Jacobson, supra note 2, at 230.
4 57 See Viscusi, supra note 27; Posner, supra note 10.458 Jacobson, supra note 2, at 234.459Viscusi, supra note 27, at 544.460LaFrance, supra note 1 at 198.
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Furthermore, "the MSA leaves the tobacco companies largely free to
pursue their pre-existing, offending misconduct.",461  Regarding a
subject inspiring public controversy and political conflict, it is
important to bear in mind that the positions need not be framed simply
in terms of pro-smoking and anti-smoking. "In truth, tobacco litigation
is poised midway between the destruction of a nation's health, on the
one hand, and the destruction of a major industry, on the other. 4 62
46 1Id. at 195.4621Id. at 188.
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